A typical clickjacking attack loads a site in a transparent iframe and asks the user to click an underlying element. The user thinks it is interacting with the attacker’s page, while the input actually goes to the transparent iframe. To avoid this, the X-Frame-Options header and frame-ancestors option in the content security policy are available to instruct browsers to not load the site in an iframe. This post explains more about these headers.

Clickjacking using transparent iframes

Clickjacking occurs due to a lack of display integrity: there is an element on the page that can be clicked, but it is not displayed. This means that the user can not determine the consequences of clicking on the page.

This is typically done using iframes, because iframes make it possible for input actions to perform something that the attacker’s site can not: do cross-origin requests with the user’s cookies. Although iframes are not the cause of clickjacking, they are a useful tool and a typical solution to protect against clickjacking is to refuse the page to load in an iframe.

This is a bit of a hack, because iframes are actually useful sometimes and they are not the cause of the problem. A better solution would to establish display integrity, for example by requiring elements to be fully visible to receive input. Dan Kaminsky presented a solution on Defcon 23, and the W3C is working on a standard to ensure display integrity.

Refusing to load in an iframe is still an effective way to avoid clickjacking, because many sites have no legitimate use to be loaded in an iframe. Therefore we will look further into the headers that control this behavior.

Headers to block iframe loading

There are two headers that control iframe loading:

X-Frame-Options: DENY
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'

Both headers have parameters that makes it possible to block framing altogether, allow it only from within the same site, or allow it from another site.

The X-Frame-Options header was never standardized, but it is currently supported in more browsers than the frame-ancestors directive. X-Frame-Options is supported from Internet Explorer 8 on, whereas frame-ancestors is currently not supported in any Microsoft browser.

These headers kindly request the browser to not display the page in an iframe. The HTTP request is still done, but the resulting web page is not displayed in the iframe, and the browser typically gives an error message in the console:

Refused to display 'http://good.internal/good.php' in a frame because an ancestor violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "frame-ancestors 'none'".

Checking all ancestors

With both headers it is possible to specify that a page may only be framed by other pages on the same origin:

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'

This way, pages on the same domain can include each other in an iframe. However, there is a subtle difference between these two headers: frame-ancestors will check the origin of all frames, while X-Frame-Options only checks the frame against the top-level location. This makes a difference when you have an iframe in an iframe.

In this example, good.internal has the header X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN. It is still possible to include it in an iframe from another domain, given that than page is included in an iframe on good.internal again:

Good.internal includes an iframe with evil.internal with an iframe with good.internal

This works because the origin of the inner frame, good.internal, is checked against the origin of the top-level frame, which is also good.internal. The fact that evil.internal is in between is ignored.

In contrast, frame-ancestors checks all intermediate frames, and when this header is enabled the inner frame is no longer displayed:

Good.internal is not loaded in the iframe

Update: browser vendors are thinking about changing X-Frame-Options to check all intermediate frames.

Specifying other origins

With both headers you can specify another web site that is allowed to load the content in an iframe:

X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM https://example.com/
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors https://example.com/

Here, only pages on example.com may include the page in an iframe.

Unfortunately, this is poorly supported by the different browsers. The allow-from directive is not supported in Chrome, Safari or Opera. Since Internet Explorer and Edge do not support frame-ancestors, you have to combine both headers if you want to use this functionality.

With the frame-ancestors directive you can use wildcards and specify as many URLs as you want, but with X-Frame-Options you can specify just one exact URL. If you want to allow framing from multiple URLs, there are some workarounds you can implement. First, you can create a different page for every site that you want your iframe in, and vary your allow-from depending on which page is included. Secondly, you can check the Referer header to check which site has included your page in an iframe.

Meta tag won’t work

Normally you can fake headers in HTML using a meta tag:

<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">

This does not work for the X-Frame-Options header or the frame-ancestors directive. In contrast to the headers, the meta tag is embedded in the page. It is handled during the rendering of the page, something which the headers are supposed to block when it is done in an iframe. To correctly block iframe loading, the frame options should be known before rendering the page, and that is why the options should be in a header.

Chrome tried to correctly handle the meta tag for X-Frame-Options, but subsequently removed it because it does not provide a reliable protection.

Browser support

  IE / Edge Firefox Chrome Safari Opera
X-Frame-Options 8.0 3.6.9 4.0 4.0 10.50
ALLOW-FROM 8.0 18      
frame-ancestors 15 36 40 10 27


There are differences in behavior and support between both headers. Using both headers gives the best protection against iframe-based clickjacking.